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The Public Accountant and the Investing Public
*
By Frederick B. Andrews
In recommending to the congress the legislation which has
since become known as the “federal securities act of 1933,”
President Roosevelt said:
“What we seek is a return to a clearer understanding of the
ancient truth that those who manage banks, corporations, and
other agencies handling or using other people’s money are trustees
acting for others.”

My purpose is to discuss the function of the public accountant
in facilitating this trusteeship—to indicate the extent to which
he may, and beyond which he may not, reasonably be held
responsible to the investing public. The thesis which I present to
you is that the public accounting profession has formulated an
adequate concept of that responsibility and has faithfully dis
charged it in the largest measure possible under present condi
tions, that its work may be facilitated if auditors are made di
rectly responsible to the investing public, and that the investing
public must not expect too much of the public accountant, as I
believe in some instances it has.
There has been much loose talk during the past few years, and
latterly some loose writing, with regard to the reports of certified
public accountants on companies which have collapsed. Ac
countants have been talking among themselves, as engineers do
when a levee breaks, architects when a building collapses or
lawyers when the criminal statutes conspicuously fail to check a
“crime wave.” Such talk is not loose; it understands difficulties,
and if it recognizes shortcomings, it does so with the serious
purpose of seeking a remedy for them which will not entail other
evils of perhaps greater magnitude. Emphatically it does not
constitute a plea of mea culpa.
It would be futile for us to wish to be shielded from the search
light of criticism, whether by accountants or by laymen. No
part of our system of public financing can hope to escape inquiry
after such a debacle as we have witnessed during the past four
years. It is only when critics wilfully or ignorantly assign to
certified public accountants burdens of responsibility which are
*A paper read to the National Association of Securities Commissioners at Milwaukee, Wis
consin, September, 1933.
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not fairly theirs, and overlook or discount positive accomplish
ments of great value, that I term their pronouncements “loose
talk.”
The most notable example appeared recently, embellished
by a number of cartoons in which a full half of the author’s
opprobrium is directed at the certified public accountant. No
certified public accountant’s report could be so replete with
half-truths, with misconceptions and with errors of omission.
Although its announced intention is to deal with “this business
of the reports and audits of certified public accountants covering
companies in which we are asked to invest,” and its concluding
sentence is “Honest audits are imperative,” still, not more than
three of its ten sub-captions refer to public accountants, and one
of those reads “Don’t blame the accountant.” And that con
cluding sentence, “Honest audits are imperative,” reminds me of
the ship’s mate who, smarting under a log-reference to his own
insobriety, found opportunity to write on the ship’s log: “The
captain was sober today”; absolutely true, but absolutely mis
leading and utterly unfair.
The article deals principally with the methods of the promoters
in some of the companies which have so spectacularly collapsed
during “the years of the locust.” If the general public under
standing of these methods is anywhere near accurate, they should
not be condoned. But the attempt to pin on the certified public
accountant the blame for losses sustained from these crashes, and
from business failures generally, is not only unfair in conception
but inept in execution.
In one of these cases, the article says, “the reports of certified
public accountants fooled everyone.” I submit that this is a
very loose statement. Let us admit that many people were
fooled. It does not follow that this includes every reader of the
reports mentioned. We have no way of knowing how many
people were kept out of that enterprise because their intelligent
reading of these very reports warned them away.
It is also complained that the reports “showed that the com
pany had a surplus of $365,000 when its books failed to show a
debt of eight million dollars.” What was the character of this
debt? And what effect would it have had on the surplus if
shown? These are questions which are not answered. Neither
does the article indicate how or whether the public accountant
could have discovered its existence. These oversights indicate
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that the author was not entirely careful in the preparation of his
article.
Then there is the story of a plumber who suffered loss because
he extended credit in reliance on the simple fact that the balancesheet showed a surplus. Now, we can not contemplate anyone’s
heavy loss with equanimity, but to rest an assertion that this
victim had been “careful to look at the entire situation before he
went into it,” and that his loss was attributable to the short
comings of the certified public accountant, merely on the ground
that “his eyes glanced down at the—‘surplus account’,” betrays
an only half-informed realization of the significance of that
account. Any experienced credit man wants to know more than
the amount of book surplus before granting requested credit.
The simple fact is that swindles have been perpetrated on the
public by wildcat financiers. Sometimes they have had the
temerity to use in their schemes financial statements audited by
certified public accountants. They have been emboldened to do
this because some members of the investing public are so gullible
as to believe that the mere presence of a certified public account
ant’s report is a guaranty of the integrity of the enterprise, no
matter what may be said in it. It may be that you, by reason of
the offices you hold, are particularly interested in this section of
the investing public; but the public accountant can do no more
than confirm the accuracy of the information given. He can
not endow people with the ability to understand what they read.
The article to which I have referred builds up to a suggestion as
to what a certified public accountant’s report should include, but
contains nothing new: in almost every particular its recommenda
tions coincide with the settled opinion of the profession. More
than sixteen years ago the American Institute of Accountants, at
the request of the federal trade commission, prepared a mem
orandum of procedure for verifying financial statements which
was approved by that commission and by the federal reserve
board and subsequently published in pamphlet form with several
reprintings and given wide distribution. After ten years the
memorandum was revised and it was republished in 1929, again
as the result of consideration by the American Institute of Ac
countants and under the imprint of the federal reserve board.
The pamphlet is entitled Verification of Financial Statements, and
each of you is probably familiar with it. Any report based on an
audit conforming to the requirements set forth in that pamphlet
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will be all that any investor has the right to ask from a certified
public accountant. I shall shortly give a brief summary of these
requirements in the hope that you may see what information
the profession itself has agreed that the investing public should
have.
If we look to the origin of public accounting practice in this
country we find foreign capitalists—largely British—sending
accountants here to get first-hand information as to what was
being done with their money. Perhaps this is why the earliest
chartered accountants came from Scotland. But my point is,
that the public accountants who verified the accounts of an
enterprise were employed by those who furnished the capital for
that enterprise. We must come, and we are coming, to that sit
uation in this country, and I submit that the investing public of
the United States would be better off today if it had insisted from
1923 to 1930 that American accountants be sent to Sweden, to
Germany and to South America for the purpose of seeing what
was happening to the vast sums of money lent to those countries
and also had insisted that public accountants of their own choos
ing be permitted to audit the accounts of even domestic enter
prises in which they invested. On the domestic side of this
assertion, it may be that the investors would have chosen the
same accountants who in fact did audit those enterprises, but it
would still have been a very different situation.
We must recognize, as President Roosevelt said, that corporate
management is a trusteeship. The beneficiaries are the investing
public—investors in the stocks and bonds of the enterprises the
control of which is committed to the managing trustees. Stock
holders and bondholders are entitled to have their questions
answered, or to be told that specific questions are of such import
that public answers would be detrimental to the enterprise, and
why. They should not be required to be content with the infor
mation which management sees fit to give them, supported only
by the auditor’s certificate that the information, however mean
ingless, is correct. The greatest difficulty confronting many
investors is that they are inarticulate—they do not know what
questions to ask. As a consequence, despite the fact that they
may be furnished with financial statements, they remain in
ignorance of the affairs of their company, and, if they are so
fortunate as to suffer no loss, that fact is due, perhaps to the
management which may love integrity for its own sake, perhaps
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to other stockholders sufficiently informed and alert to hold
management within the paths of rectitude.
Rarely in this country does the public accountant have such a
relation to the stockholders as to give him other than a moral
duty to them, and it is to his everlasting credit that he recognizes
this moral duty so clearly that he is not infrequently required to
suffer direct financial loss in the performance of it. Of this the
public seldom hears, but since the newspapers mentioned it quite
casually it may not be amiss for me to remind you that in a case
in Illinois this very thing happened—and it was only after prac
tising public accountants had refused to certify the accounts that
the company called on an employee who held a C. P. A. certificate
to do the necessary certifying. Such a pretense to independence
should not be possible. The federal trade commission, by its
regulations issued under the new federal securities act, has refused
to recognize the certificate of a certified or public accountant who
is employed by or is financially interested in the enterprise whose
accounts he certifies; and the American Institute of Accountants
has recently gone on record as holding it improper for a member
to certify the accounts of a company in which he has a substantial
financial interest. It is a short step from this point to the propo
sition that the public accountant must not owe his selection, and
hence his opportunity to earn his fee, to the very management
whose accounts are under audit. It is no reflection on the in
tegrity of the public accountant to say that he should not be
placed in this embarrassing position. There is no answer to the
proposition that the public accountant who is to audit a com
pany’s accounts should be chosen by its stockholders; the state
ment that they are not competent to make this choice begs the
question, because even if they do thoughtlessly give their proxies
to management the situation is still no worse than at present and
merely indicates that they really are not competent to invest their
funds in corporate shares. Anyone who is not able and willing to
give his investments adequate study and supervision should con
fine them to government bonds or other issues of similar safety
and low return. Yet unless and until we are willing to forbid
unlicensed persons to buy stocks and bonds we must regard them
as competent to perform the functions of stockholders and
bondholders, and we should take such steps as we can to ensure
that they be furnished with all proper information to help them
in doing so. A year ago I was able to find only one jurisdiction
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in this country—Massachusetts—which gave the stockholders a
voice in selecting the company auditors; since then Pennsylvania
has passed a corporation law which requires the auditor to be
selected by stockholders in the absence of specific by-laws to the
contrary.
According to the newspapers, the United States Steel Corpora
tion has voluntarily arranged that its auditors shall be elected by
the stockholders. I do not believe that this will result in any
change, either in the personnel of the auditors or in the manner
in which they discharge their duty to the investors. But it does
this: it anticipates future emergencies by establishing the auditors
as independent advisors of the stockholders, co-equal for that
purpose with the management itself. Regardless of how it may
affect the present auditors and the present management, it is a
most desirable safeguard for the future.
There has been considerable discussion with reference to
published accounts, hung on the question “Whose accounts are
they?” That is to say, may the auditor revise the statements to
conform to his views of how they should be presented in order to
make them effective, or must he content himself with the form
adopted by the company, and, if he finds the figures correct, so
certify? Personally, I have leaned to the former view, but I can
easily understand the latter. Management prepares the finan
cial statements from the records, then calls in the public account
ant and says to him, “Audit these records, compare the state
ments with them, and say whether or not the statements are
correct.” It is a perfectly honorable engagement which the
auditor is asked to accept, and a man must mind his belly. If
the statement of income contains only two figures, “operating
income” and “net income after all charges,” and the auditor
finds those two figures correct, there is no reason under our
system of management-selected auditors why he should not so
certify. It may or may not occur to the investor in the company
to seek further information; if he does, he may get it, and if he
does not he is immediately set down as satisfied with that which
has been presented. But if the auditor had been elected by the
stockholders, his instructions would undoubtedly have been to
some such general effect as this: “Audit the accounts of the com
pany and tell us what has been done with our money.” These
instructions would not be satisfied by certifying to the correctness
of such an income statement. If management would give ade
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quate recognition to the trust character of its position, it would
not itself be content with such a statement.
The members of your association are chosen, by election or
appointment, to represent these inarticulate stockholders. It
may be that the stockholders would like you to do all their work
for them, and to make a yes-or-no decision as to whether a given
security is or is not a good investment, with a guaranty backing
your affirmative judgment. This, of course, you can not do.
But you can do much for them by insisting that all necessary
information be available to those investors who are able and
willing to use it, withholding your permission for the sale of
securities whose issuers have not furnished such information to be
made available to investors. Some investors may not be able to
utilize it, but some can, and the mere fact that it must be prepared
and filed in your offices, where it will be available to the public,
will have a salutary effect on management.
Just what this information should be will of course vary so
greatly in different cases as to make almost every enterprise
unique. But the old cry that the information will be used by
competitors to the company’s detriment should not be given too
great weight. An enterprise which looks to the public for capital
ought not to be using that capital in such fashion that it would be
jeopardized by publicity. The final report of the auditors who
last year investigated the affairs of Kreuger & Toll, after Ivan
Kreuger’s death, contains this very pertinent comment: “The
history of this group of companies emphasizes anew the truth that
enterprises in which complete secrecy on the part of the chief
executive officer as to the way in which important parts of the
capital are employed is, or is alleged to be, essential to success
are fundamentally unsuited for public investment, since such
secrecy undermines all ordinary safeguards and affords to the
dishonest executive unequalled opportunity for the perpetration
and concealment of frauds.”
If the stockholders were to select the auditors, these latter
might well advise the stockholders that information of interest
to them was being withheld from published statements because
its publication was deemed by the management to be detrimental
to the best interests of the company. Then if there were a
sufficient number of stockholders interested in determining the
company’s policies they could order the divulgence of this in
formation, and the auditor would be secure in his position. If
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such stockholders were a minority in a large company, the news
papers might safely be relied upon to give publicity to the con
troversy, as they did recently in one case with the result that
finally a majority of the stockholders was aroused to action. If,
on the other hand, the stockholders should agree to accept such
information as was tendered them and not to ask for more, they
would still be in the position of having made the final decision as
to how much information they wanted.
I have no doubt that you are all acquainted with the regis
tration-statement form prescribed by the federal trade commis
sion under the new federal securities act, but I should like to
point out some of its major provisions, all of which are in accord
with the bulletin prepared by the American Institute of Account
ants and published by the federal reserve board, to which I have
previously referred.
First, fixed-asset accounts must be so set up in the balancesheet as to show cost, book appreciation and provision for
depreciation, all separately;
Second, intangibles must be separated from other assets
and the basis of valuation disclosed;
Third, investments in subsidiary or affiliated companies
must be separated from other investments, and the basis of
valuation of each disclosed;
Fourth, the amounts of both receivables and bad debt
reserves must be shown, not merely the net receivables after
deducting the reserves;
Fifth, the basis for valuation of inventories must be
declared and should preferably be the lower of cost or market;
Sixth, the market as well as book values of marketable
securities must be shown, and indebtedness of officers or
stockholders and of affiliated companies must also be segre
gated from other current assets;
Seventh, liabilities must be classified in such detail as to
show priorities both of lien and maturity;
Eighth, the proceeds of issue must be shown for all classes
of capital stock, and the source and amount of each element
of surplus must be set forth clearly;
Ninth, gross sales and details of cost of goods sold are
requested to be stated, although not required if the company
will be injured thereby;
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Tenth, charges for bad-debt-loss provisions, fixed-asset
maintenance, taxes and depreciation must be shown sepa
rately; the new regulations also require in another place
detailed information regarding compensation paid to officers,
and it might be well to include the total amount so paid as a
separate charge in the income statement;
Eleventh, extraordinary and non-recurring revenues and
expenses must be separated from others and clearly de
scribed ; and
Twelfth, there must be a statement showing all changes
in surplus during the period covered by the income statement.
There is, of course, much more in the work of the public ac
countant than the arranging of items in the balance-sheet and
statement of income and surplus in such fashion as to bring out
the facts which investors are entitled to know. The bulletin of
the federal reserve board, Verification of Financial Statements,
contains a detailed manual of sound auditing procedure, the
following of which would place the auditor in position to know the
character of his materials before he begins to assemble the finan
cial statements or to test such statements previously prepared
by the company under audit. It would be very pertinent for
securities commissioners to make inquiry of a public accountant
whose certificate is presented to them in support of financial
statements filed with applications for permission to sell securities
as to whether or not before issuing such certificate he had made
an audit conforming in all particulars to the procedure laid down
in that bulletin. In many cases the management of companies
under audit has been unable or unwilling to see the reason for
some of the steps of audit procedure which are laid down in that
bulletin and has required the auditor to forego such steps. If an
inquiry made by a securities commissioner should develop this
as a fact, the commissioner might well judge as to the sufficiency
of the audit with the specified steps omitted. When you consider
the fact that the public accountant is engaged in the first instance
by management you will recognize that he is under compulsion to
accept such restrictions with the single alternative of refusing
the engagement. In the latter case it is not improbable that the
work will be done by others with a lower ethical ideal and with
less regard for the rights of investors to full and complete infor
mation. Thus it is better to accept the engagement in spite of
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those restrictions and to do the utmost for investors which is
possible under the terms of employment.
The public accountant who has been selected by the stock
holders of a corporation, independent of its management, to audit
its accounts, which constitute a record of that management’s
stewardship, will obviously enjoy an improved position and a
greater independence, with benefit resulting not only to the
stockholders but to bondholders and other investors as well. In
years gone by trust indentures underlying bond issues frequently
contained a provision to the effect that the accounts of the
issuing company should be audited by a certified public account
ant selected by or at least acceptable to the trustee, with the
result that the public accountant knew that his engagement
depended on his doing work and rendering a report which would
be satisfactory to the trustee as a representative of the bond
holders. With the increase in the amount of public financing
done by issuance of preferred and common stock and with the
growth of the practice on the part of corporations to have their
accounts audited by public accountants selected by the manage
ment, this practice of having the auditors in a sense selected by
the trustee for the bondholders has fallen into disuse. It might
well be revived.
I have tried to show the importance of having the public
accountant selected by and responsible to those who have fur
nished the capital of the enterprise to be audited, that is to say the
investing public, and to indicate the type of information which he
should be required to give for the benefit of the investing public.
It is important that the investing public should have this infor
mation, which can be supplied to it only through properly pre
pared financial statements, but a word of caution is necessary
lest this information be regarded by some as all sufficient. That
word of caution was most eloquently spoken by the American
Institute’s committee on cooperation with stock exchanges in a
report which was made public last winter. The committee said:
“But even when all has been done that can be done, the limita
tions on the significance of even the best of accounts must be
recognized, and the shorter the period covered by them the more
pronounced usually are these limitations. Accounts are essen
tially continuous historical records; and, as is true of history in
general, correct interpretations and sound forecasts for the future
can not be reached upon a hurried survey of temporary condi
tions, but only by longer retrospect and a careful distinction
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between permanent tendencies and transitory influences. If
the investor is unable or unwilling to make or secure an adequate
survey, it will be best for him not to rely on the results of a
superficial one.”
The extent of the public accountant’s financial responsibility
to the investing public has entered what appears likely to be a
long-drawn-out process of determination. It has been held that
the public accountant is liable for damages if guilty of such
palpable negligence as to amount to fraud on the investing
public even though there be no fraudulent intent. Provisions for
such financial responsibility on the part of the public accountant
are included in the new federal securities act. Many public
accountants feel that these provisions are of such drastic charac
ter as to defeat their own purpose by imposing a risk too great for
a careful and solvent public accountant to assume. Under this
new law it is conceivable that a public accountant with sufficient
temerity to certify financial statements will find that he has
risked his entire personal fortune, not only on his skill and ability
as an auditor, but on his ability to demonstrate to a jury of
laymen that his highly technical work was done honestly and
with reasonable care and ability. The unfairness of putting the
public accountant in this position will be seen most clearly when
you consider that even if he succeeds in his defense he still will
have incurred heavy expenses for which no provision can possibly
be made in fixing the amount of his audit fee. He is put in a
position where he must even sustain attacks brought in bad faith,
with no penalty imposed upon his accuser when he utterly fails
to make out a case. This risk on the public accountant’s part
would certainly seem to be disproportionate, and it is to be hoped
that a way may be found to permit him to perform his very
valuable function without being thus overburdened.
The investing public has a right to look to the public account
ant for skill, judgment and integrity of a high order, and the
public accountant similarly has a right to expect of the investing
public a recognition of the unavoidable limitations on his work
and a fair and thorough study of what he submits as a result of it.
Thus and only thus can the two groups be mutually helpful.
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